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depends on how closely our measures derived
from commodity markets are connected to the
inflation rates and real interest rates that matter
for consumption and investment decisions.
Since 1997, the United States has issued
inflation-indexed bonds. By extracting observa-
tions about expected inflation and the real interest
rate in this market, several studies have found
evidence about how real and nominal interest
rates react to monetary policy surprises. For exam-
ple, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) show
that the implied forward 1-year rate at the 9-year
horizon responds significantly to a surprise in
the federal funds market. They find that the sur-
prise is contained in the expected inflation pre-
mium and not in the implied forward real rate.
Kliesen and Schmid find a similar result for
the 10-year rate (2004a) and for the real rate
(2004b), but in their papers, it is not clear what
part of the 10-year term structure is responding
to the news. There is one drawback to these meas-
ures of the real rate and the expected inflation rate:
The maturity of these investments is measured in
years, and the analysis does not reveal informa-
tion about the response of the real interest rate
T
he Federal Reserve targets the interest
rate on federal funds to implement
monetary policy. The interest rate is
composed of two unobservable factors,
the real interest rate and a premium for expected
inflation, which are important for understanding
the appropriate setting of the target. Knowing how
these two factors change in response to changes
in the target is also important for implementing
monetary policy. Empirical evidence about the
level and changes in these factors is complicat-
ed by the lack of direct observations on them.1
In this paper, we extract measures of the interest
rate and expected inflation from commodity
futures prices and use these measures to examine
how interest rates and expected inflation respond
to monetary policy shocks. Throughout this paper
we use the terms inflation and real interest rate
interchangeably with commodity price inflation
and commodity own rate. Whether our results
have important implications for monetary policy
This paper constructs daily measures of the real interest rate and expected inflation using commodity
futures prices and the term structure of Treasury yields. We find that commodity futures markets
respond to surprise increases in the federal funds rate target by raising the inflation rate expected
over the next 3 to 9 months. There is no evidence that the real interest rate responds to surprises
in the federal funds target. The data from the commodity futures markets are highly volatile; we
show that one can substantially reduce the noise using limited information estimators such as the
median change. Nevertheless, the basket of commodities actually traded daily is quite narrow and
we do not know whether our observable rates are closely connected to the unobservable inflation
and real rates that affect economywide consumption and investment decisions.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2005, 87(3), pp. 395-405.
1 Clark and Kozicki (2004) survey the literature and show that there
is a great deal of uncertainty in real-time estimates of the equilib-
rium real interest rate.
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             or expected inflation in the short end of the term
structure.
Cornell and French (1986) provide indirect
observations on the short end of the term struc-
ture by using a measure of the real interest rate
extracted from commodity futures prices. They
use this measure to gauge the reaction of real
interest rates and expected inflation to surprises
in the weekly money supply announcements
between October 6, 1977, and March 23, 1984.
Their results were somewhat surprising: They
found that it was expected inflation in commodity
prices and not real returns that went up when
there was an unexpected increase in the money
supply. These results were obtained using data
after October 6, 1979, an era in which the Treasury
bill (T-bill) rate responded strongly and positively
to surprise increases in the money supply. Before
this result, previous authors concluded that these
increases in the T-bill rate were due to rising real
interest rates—a liquidity effect, perhaps associ-
ated with sticky prices (Roley and Walsh, 1985)
or with rationing in the market for borrowed
reserves (Gavin and Karamouzis, 1985). 
We find results reminiscent of Cornell and
French (1986). We estimate the market’s reaction
to surprises in the Fed’s interest rate target. The
next few sections explain how the market variables
and the policy target surprises are constructed.
In the results section, we show that expected
inflation responds positively and significantly to
surprises in the federal funds rate target in the
horizon from 0 to 9 months. We also show that
there is no significant response of real interest
rates out to a year on the term structure. Although
the real interest rate and expected inflation rate
constructed using averages from commodity
futures data are highly volatile, limited informa-
tion estimates such as the median change can
substantially reduce the noise in such measures.   
MEASURING THE REAL INTEREST
RATE
The real own rate of return for each commod-
ity is implied by the term structure of interest rates
in the market for T-bills and the term structure of
futures prices in the commodity futures market.2
Suppose that there is a fixed bundle of consump-
tion goods, Q, that is traded in futures markets in
every period. The real interest rate in terms of Q
from time t to time t + k is defined as the rate at
which the household can contract today to
exchange units of Q at time t for units of Q at t + k.
The cost of bundle Q at time t is St defined as 
(1) ,
where there are N commodities indexed by i, qi
is the amount of good i in the bundle, and Si
t is
the price of good i at time t.
If there were complete futures markets for all
the goods in Q, then the household could contract
to buy the bundle at time t for consumption at
time t + k. The cost of the bundle is given by the




t + k is the futures price of good i at time t
for delivery k periods ahead. At time t the house-
hold can purchase discount bonds that mature at
t + k and use the funds to buy the bundle of com-
modities, Q. The price of the bundle at time t then
is tFt + kt Bt + k, where tBt + k is the price of a discount
bond that pays one dollar at t + k. The gross inter-
est rate from t to t + k, 1+ trt + k, is the ratio of the
cost of the bundle today to the cost of the future
bundle today:
(3) .
Cornell and French (1986) show that this real
rate is an expenditure-weighted average of the
commodity own rates.3


























396 MAY/JUNE 2005 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
2 This section draws heavily from Cornell and French (1986). 
3 They assume that the commodity bundle includes all goods traded
in the market, so the commodity own rate is the relevant real
interest rate. To the extent that some goods are excluded, this real
rate may differ from the real rate that affects consumer and business
spending decisions. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) show system-
atic differences between returns in commodity futures and bonds
at lower frequencies. later, date t is the day of the policy action. We use
the maturing contract as the spot price to ensure
that the spot and futures prices refer to exactly
the same item being traded. However, if the matur-
ing contract does not mature within the next 46
days, we omit this spot price from our data set.
We construct a set of futures prices for commodity
contracts maturing at k days for k = {90, 180, 270,
360}. We then calculate the implied forward own
rates. When there are no spot prices available, we
are able to calculate the implied forward rates
because the spot price drops out of the formula.
For example, the own rate over the horizon t + k
+ 90 is given by
(4)               ,
and the implied forward rate from t + k to t + k + 90
is given by
(5)            ,
where the implied forward rate is the rate at which
one can trade the bundle at t + k for the bundle
at t + k + 90.
MEASURING THE EXPECTED
INFLATION RATE
The expected inflation rate in commodities is
calculated from the relative bases in commodity
markets. The basis is defined as the difference
between the spot price and the futures price of a
commodity. Over the horizon t + k + 90, this
expected inflation rate in a given commodity,
then, is given as the relative basis, tbt + k+90, which
is just the basis divided by the spot price: 
(6)                    , 
or, in gross terms,
(7)                      . 
We aggregate relative bases across the com-












































for commodities. We calculate the term structure
of implied expected inflation rates in the same
manner as we calculated the implied own rates.
For example, the implied forward expected infla-
tion rate from t + k to t + k + 90 is given by
(8)                    ,
where the implied forward expected inflation
rate is the 3-month inflation rate expected for
the period t + k through t + k + 90. Note that this
calculation includes the basis risk—that is, a
premium for bearing risk that the actual price 
in the future will be different from today’s futures
price. Our web-based data appendix (which
appears with this article at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/)
includes summary statistics for the changes in
commodity own rates and commodity bases
around Fed policy surprises.
THE COMMODITY DATA
The 34 commodities included in our futures
market data are listed in Table 1.4 The commodi-
ties were traded on several different North
American exchanges: the Coffee Sugar Cocoa
Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, the New York Mercantile
Exchange, the Kansas City Board of Trade, the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, the New York
Cotton Exchange, and the Winnipeg Stock
Exchange. On average, commodity prices fell 2/3
of a percentage point per year during our sample
period. But there was substantial dispersion across
commodities. At the high end, palladium was an
outlier, rising on average 11.93 percent per year.
At the low end, orange juice fell on average 5.79
percent per year. There were contracts expiring
for all of the commodities except high-grade
copper throughout our full sample period. The
first futures contract in high-grade copper expired
in 1989.
1 90
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4 We chose not to update the data set to include the post-2001 data.
Our data, which come directly from the market electronic feeds,
were purchased from the Institute for Financial Markets in August
2002. This company, sold to MJK Associates, no longer provides
data in the format used in 2002. Armesto and Gavin
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Table 1
Commodities Included in the Sample
No. of contracts  No. of contracts  Average 
Commodity Traded in market expiring in 1988 expiring in 2001 inflation rate
Coffee (KC) CSCE 5 5 –5.64%
Corn (CN) CBT 5 7 –1.80%
Feeder cattle (FC) CME 8 8 0.22%
Gold (GC) NYMEX 6 12 –3.31%
High-grade copper (HG)  NYMEX 0 12 –5.01%
Live hogs (LH) CME 7 7 3.53%
Live cattle (LC) CME 6 6 –0.20%
Oats (OA) CBT 5 5 –4.71%
Platinum (PL) NYMEX 4 4 0.26%
Pork bellies (PB) CME 5 5 5.46%
Silver (SI) NYMEX 6 12 –2.61%
Soybeans (SY) CBT 7 7 –4.36%
Soybean meal (SM) CBT 8 8 –3.64%
Soybean oil (BO) CBT 8 8 –2.62%
Wheat (WC) CBT 5 5 –3.49%
Silver 1000 oz (AG) CBT 6 12 –2.67%
Gold – kilo (KI) CBT 6 6 –3.64%
Sugar (SB) CSCE 5 4 –0.20%
Wheat (KW) KCBT 5 5 –1.56%
Wheat – white (MW) MGE 5 5 –1.20%
Cotton (CT) NYCE 5 5 –1.60%
Crude oil – light (CL) NYMEX 12 12 4.28%
Heating oil (HO) NYMEX 12 12 2.93%
Liquid propane (PN) NYMEX 12 12 6.85%
Palladium (PA) NYMEX 4 4 11.93%
Unleaded gasoline (HU) NYMEX 12 12 6.45%
Cocoa (CC) CSCE 5 5 –3.15%
Orange juice (JO) NYCE 6 6 –5.79%
Rice (NR) CBT 5 6 –1.44%
Lumber (LB) CME 6 6 2.85%
Flax seed (WF) WINN 3 5 –2.76%
Oats (WO) WINN 5 5 –3.50%
Rapeseed (WP) WINN 5 7 –1.49%
Wheat (WW) WINN 5 5 0.04%
NOTE: CSCE, Coffee Sugar Cocoa Exchange; CBT, Chicago Board of Trade; CME, Chicago Mercantile Exchange; NYMEX, New York
Mercantile Exchange; KCBT, Kansas City Board of Trade; MGE, Minneapolis Grain Exchange; NYCE, New York Cotton Exchange;
WINN, Winnipeg Stock Exchange.The initial format of the data consisted of
hundreds of individual files, each containing
detailed information about a particular commodity
futures contract: the underlying commodity; the
month and year the contract expired; and the
open, close, high, and low prices for each day that
the contract was traded. From these files we con-
struct time series of prices for all 34 commodities
for days surrounding our measure of monetary
policy surprises. The difference between the close
price on the day before the Fed’s target change
and the opening price on the day after the Fed’s
target change is used to gauge how the market
responds to incoming information about monetary
policy.5 A term structure of prices for each com-
modity is constructed using contracts with differ-
ent expiration dates. 
The number and length of contracts varies
across commodities. The most frequently traded
commodities are crude oil, heating oil, liquid
propane, and unleaded gasoline, which have con-
tracts expiring in every month. Others were not
as active. Contracts for platinum and palladium
expire just four times per year. Additionally, the
length of the individual contracts varied. For
example, the majority of coffee’s commodity con-
tracts (92 percent) were traded for longer than one
year, while no contracts were traded for less than
one month. Conversely, the majority of flax seed
contracts traded within the horizon of 6 to 12
months (86 percent), whereas only two contracts
(3 percent) traded for longer than one year. Silver
(1000 oz) had the largest quantity of contracts that
traded for less than one month (7 percent). 
There would be many gaps in the time series
of term structures if we insisted on using only
those contracts that expired exactly 3, 6, 9, and
12 months from the day of a monetary policy sur-
prise. We use simple decision rules to construct
a term structure of prices that approximates prices
at spot, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, and 12-month
horizons. First, we looked at all contracts that had
been traded in the individual commodity on the
day before and day after a monetary policy sur-
prise. We used the maturing contract as a measure
of the spot price to ensure that the underlying
commodity for the spot price was the same as for
the futures contracts. A contract price was consid-
ered to be the spot price if the contract had less
than 47 days from the day before the policy sur-
prise until expiration. For the 3-month price, a
contract was selected if it had between 48 and 137
days until expiration. Similar windows were con-
structed for the 6-, 9-, and 12-month horizons.
For the 6-month futures price, the window was
from 138 to 227 days. The 9-month window was
from 228 to 317 days, and the 12-month window
was from 318 to 417 days until expiration.
When there is no contract expiring in a win-
dow, then we have no observation for that com-
modity. When there was more than one contract
within the window, we chose the one closest to
our ideal term structure; that is, for the spot price,
we choose the contract with the closest date to
expiration. For all others, the preference was for
the center of the window. For example, for the 3-
month futures price for the day after the Fed’s
policy change, the contract used to represent the
3-month futures price was the one closest to expir-
ing in 90 days. This selection method is similar
for the 6-, 9-, and 12-month futures price. These
prices were then used to compute our own rates
and bases.
WHAT IS A SURPRISE IN THE
FEDERAL FUNDS RATE TARGET?
We use measures of the monetary policy sur-
prise as constructed by Poole, Rasche, and
Thornton (2002). Data from the federal funds
futures market is used to measure the expected
change in monetary policy. The federal funds
futures market is a bet on the average effective
federal funds rate for the month in which the
contract matures; as a result, it is an estimate of
market expectations about the average level of
the federal funds rate for that month. 
The Chicago Board of Trade began trading
federal funds futures contracts in October 1988.
When this trading began, the Federal Reserve was
using a target or “expected trading level” for the
Armesto and Gavin
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5 Note that, since 1994, the announcements of policy changes are
scheduled for release at a preannounced time, so that today one
could use higher-frequency data and a much smaller window in
which to measure market reaction. But in the period before 1994,
we do not have good information about when, during the day, the
market learned about the policy change.federal funds rate as a guide for daily open market
operations, but it did not announce its short-run
targets until 1994. Poole, Rasche, and Thornton
describe the history of Fed policy changes as
embodied in a target or expected trading level
for the federal funds rate for the pre-1994 period;
they also show that the market often could see
when the Fed’s target was changed. Fed policy
has been transparent since 1994, but what the
market expects as it compares with what actually
occurs is still a relevant issue. 
The unexpected component of the Fed’s
actions is implied by the change in the futures
market price from the day before to the day after
the policy change. Suppose fff h
t denotes the rate
on the h-month federal funds futures contract on
day t. This rate is equivalent to the sum of the
expectation on day t of the federal funds rate on
each day of the month, averaged across the length
of the month. Hence,
(9)                     ,  
where ff h
i denotes the federal funds rate on day i
of the hth month, Et denotes the expectation on
day t, and m denotes the number of days in the
month.
Next, consider if the Fed successfully targets
the federal funds rate, so that the actual federal
funds rate is equal to the target plus an i.i.d. mean
zero error term: 
(10)                           . 
The expectation of the future federal funds rate
depends on expectations about the policy target.
The surprise in the federal funds market is calcu-
lated as the change in the federal funds futures
price following a monetary policy action. Substi-
tuting the federal funds target into the formula
for the federal funds futures rate and taking the
difference yields
(11)     . 
If the policy change was perfectly anticipated, then
there will be no change in the futures price.
Before 1994, whether or not the market was
aware of the Fed’s actions is an issue. Poole,
Rasche, and Thornton (2002) use reports in the
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financial press to distinguish between days when
the market was aware and days when they were
unaware that policy had changed. We examine
only days in which they find that the market was
aware that policy had changed.
MEASURING THE MARKET
RESPONSE
The market response following a policy action
is measured as the change in the own rate or
expected inflation calculated using the closing
price from the day before the policy change to the
opening price on the day after. The expiration
date is fixed, so the actual horizon gets 2 days
shorter during the interval of the policy change.
The change in the 3-month-ahead own rate for a




change in the 9-month-ahead implied forward 3-




so on for the other own rates and expected infla-
tion rates. We calculate the average change in the
implied forward commodity own rate for the
bundle as  ∆krk+90,t and the average change in
expected inflation as ∆kbk+90,t+1.6 We also calcu-
late the aggregate commodity own rates and
expected inflation rates as the median commodity
change. The median changes are designated with
a med superscript. For example, the change in
the 9-month-ahead 3-month expected inflation
rate from the day before the monetary policy sur-
prise to the day after is given as ∆270bmed
360,t .
The volatility of the implied forward T-bill
rates, commodity own rates, and commodity
expected inflation rates following a monetary
policy surprise are shown in Table 2. In the first
row, we report summary statistics about the
change in the implied forward 3-month T-bill rates
following surprises in the federal funds rate. At
all four horizons, the standard deviation of the
change is 10 or 11 basis points. In the second and
third rows we report the volatility of changes in
the commodity own rates. As Mishkin (1990)
notes, this series is quite volatile relative to inter-
6 Cornell and French (1986) weighted the individual commodities
by the inverse of measures of volatility in each market. Mishkin
(1990) used an unweighted average.
Armesto and Gavin
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lowing surprises in the federal funds rate ranges
from a high of 94 basis points in the near term to
43 basis points for the implied own rate in the 6-
to 9-month horizon. In every case, the standard
deviations of the median changes are less than
half the standard deviations of the mean changes.
Here we find that the standard deviations of
changes in commodity own rates ranged from 46
basis points in the near horizon to 19 points for
the implied own rates in the 6- to 9-month horizon. 
The fourth and fifth rows report the standard
deviations of the commodity expected inflation
rates. Here the volatility pattern is very similar to
the pattern for the own rates. The standard devi-
ation of changes following surprises in the federal
funds rate ranges from a high of 94 basis points
in the near term to 42 basis points for the implied
own rate in the 6- to 9-month horizon. Also, the
standard deviations of the median changes are
less than half the standard deviations of the mean
changes. Here we find that the standard deviations
of changes in commodity expected inflation rates
ranged from 46 basis points in the near horizon
to 18 points for the implied own rate in the 6- to
9-month horizon.
RESULTS
We run simple regressions relating changes
in the mean and median commodity own rates
to surprises in the policy action. The rationale
for this model is simply that at the moment before
the policy change, market prices reflect all the
information that is relevant, including expecta-
tions about policy. The relationship between
changes in the mean and median own rates and
the policy surprise is measured using the follow-
ing regressions:
(12)              and
(13) ,
for k = 0, 90, 180, and 270. Similar regressions are
used to measure the response of the mean and
median commodity expected inflation rates to a
monetary policy surprise:
(14)             and
(15)             .
The estimation results for these equations are
reported in Table 3. The important effect of idio-
syncratic shocks results in very low R2s for the
regression of the commodity own rates and
expected inflation rates on the federal funds sur-
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Table 2
Volatility of Changes in Rates Following Federal Funds Rate Surprises 
0 to 3 months 3 to 6 months 6 to 9 months 9 to 12 months
Implied forward T-bill rates 10 11 11 11
Commodity own rates
Mean commodity 94 58 43 58
Median commodity 46 24 19 23
Commodity inflation rates
Mean commodity 94 57 42 55
Median commodity 46 24 18 19
NOTE: Standard deviations in basis points at annual rates.
7 Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) note that the surprise in the
federal funds target is measured with error, leading to biased esti-
mates of the coefficient on the federal funds surprise. The measure-
ment error biases the coefficient toward zero. They show that the
variance of the measurement error is small and is unlikely to affect
the qualitative nature of our results.response of the own rate significantly different
from zero. At the 9- to 12-month horizon, the
response of the real rate is positive and relatively
large, but not statistically significant. 
The bottom half reports the results for the
commodity price expected inflation. The results
for the mean response are not significant except
in the case of the implied 3-month expected
inflation rate from 6 to 9 months. We get signifi-
cant results more often when we use the median
response. Mishkin (1990) argued that the Cornell
and French results are unreliable indicators of
real interest rate behavior because commodity
market returns are so highly variable relative to
expected inflation and nominal interest rates that
there is little signal about real interest rates in
the data. We reduce volatility by using the median
response measure, which increases reliability in
the significance of our results. 
Using the median measure of commodity
price expected inflation, we find that expected
inflation responded positively and significantly
to surprises in the federal funds target for the first
three horizons. Only in the case of the 9- to 12-
month rate is the response not statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level. Relative to the mean
price or own rate, the median appears to effec-
tively filter a substantial amount of idiosyncratic
noise from the commodity futures data. 
DISCUSSION
The results in Table 2 appear to be at odds
with Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) and
Kliesen and Schmid (2004a), who report that infla-
tion expectations decline when there is a surprise
increase in the federal funds target. The different
results, however, refer to different points on the
Armesto and Gavin
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Table 3
Regressions of Commodity Own Rates and Basis Changes on the Unexpected Component of
Federal Funds Announcements
β t-Statistic SEE R2
Commodity own rates
∆0r90,t+1 –0.65 –0.62 0.96 0.00
∆0r med
90,t+1 –0.40 –0.78 0.46 0.01
∆90r180,t+1 –0.03 –0.04 0.54 0.00
∆90r med
180,t+1 0.18 0.68 0.24 0.01
∆180r270,t+1 –0.41 –0.96 0.40 0.01
∆180r med
270,t+1 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.00
∆270r360,t+1 0.73 1.25 0.54 0.02
∆270r med
360,t+1 0.29 1.23 0.21 0.02
Commodity inflation rates
∆0b90,t+1 1.36 1.31 0.95 0.02
∆0bmed
90,t+1 1.10 2.23 0.45 0.06
∆90b180,t+1 0.79 1.38 0.52 0.02
∆90bmed
180,t+1 0.58 2.28 0.23 0.06
∆180b270,t+1 1.11 2.61 0.39 0.07
∆180bmed
270,t+1 0.68 3.84 0.16 0.15
∆270b360,t+1 –0.12 –0.22 0.51 0.00
∆270bmed
360,t+1 0.32 1.63 0.18 0.03
NOTE: Bold indicates that the t-statistic is significant at the 5 percent critical level. SEE is the standard error of the equation.term structure. We find that the positive impact
is largest at the 3-month horizon and is not statis-
tically significant at the 1-year horizon.
It is also quite possible that the high-frequency
response of commodity prices is not the same as
the response of prices across the broad spectrum
of goods in the economy.  However, Gorton and
Rouwenhorst (2004) use monthly data to show
that nominal commodity returns are highly and
positively correlated with CPI inflation, both its
expected and unexpected components.
Our results appear to be at odds with con-
ventional wisdom as well, which suggests that
inflation responds to policy actions only after a
long lag. The conventional view implies that the
immediate response of interest rates to a monetary
policy shock is by the real component. Recent
developments in macroeconomic theory focus on
policy in general equilibrium models. To capture
this conventional wisdom, economists have used
New Keynesian models that incorporate some
form of price stickiness.8 Gavin, Keen, and Pakko
(2004) analyze the effects of monetary policy
shocks in such a model where Calvo-style pricing
means that prices change on average once per year
and the central bank uses an interest rate rule to
implement policy. Within this framework, there
is an important difference in the effect of a shock
to the interest rate depending on whether the
shock is perceived to be temporary or persistent.9
Transitory policy shocks affect both expected infla-
tion and the real interest rate. With a transitory
shock, the federal funds rate returns to its original
level within a few quarters and the implied future
short-term rate is essentially unaffected by the
shock at the 4-quarter horizon. 
However, if the shock is persistent—that is,
the market expects that a change in the federal
funds target is likely to be fairly permanent—then
the effect of a positive shock on the implied future
short-term rate may be positive for many quarters.
But almost all the effect is due to higher expected
inflation. The predicted real interest rate effects of
a persistent shock to the federal funds rate target
are an order of magnitude smaller than are the
effects following a transitory shock. That is, state-
of-the-art macroeconomic theory predicts that the
real interest rate will not respond to federal funds
rate target shocks that are highly persistent.
It is important to understand, then, whether
monetary policy shocks are perceived as relatively
transitory or relatively permanent. Many empiri-
cal studies find that the level of the federal funds
rate behaves as if it has a random walk component.
Using the futures market data to derive the shocks
as we do, Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004)
report that shocks to the change in the federal
funds rate are highly persistent. 
In the top panel of Table 4, we report the
response of the term structure of implied future
3-month T-bill rates to surprises in monetary
policy. These coefficients were calculated by
regressing the change in the implied forward T-
bill rates on the monetary policy surprises in the
following regression:
(16)           ,
where ∆kTbillk+90,t is the change in the implied
forward T-bill rate for values of k equal to 0, 90,
180, and 270. We find that for the first four quar-
ters, the response in the implied forward T-bill
rate is fairly equal across the term structure from
3 months to 12 months. A 10-basis-point surprise
in the federal funds rate leads to a 7-basis-point
rise in the 3-month rate and to a pattern of 8-, 7-,
and 6-basis-point increases in the implied future
3-month rates at horizons ending in 6, 9, and 12
months, respectively. In the bottom panel, we
report similar regressions in which the dependent
variables are changes in the Treasury bill rates,
∆0Tbillk+90,t, maturing in k + 90 days. The regres-
sion is given as
(17)           .
The results show that the 12-month rate changes
by only very slightly less than the 3-month rate.
Markets appear to expect that a shock to the
federal funds target is relatively permanent—at
least that it persists intact for the first year. Accord-
∆∆ 09 0 2 2 2 Tbill fff kt t
h
t + =+ + ,, αβ ε
∆∆ kk t t
h
t Tbill fff + =+ + 90 1 1 1 , , αβ ε
8 See Woodford (2003, Chap. 3) for a comprehensive analysis of the
New Keynesian model. 
9 In that model the shocks follow an AR(1) process. The transitory
shock has an AR(1) parameter equal to 0.3 and the persistent
shock has a parameter value of 0.95. 
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to the federal funds rate should have significant
effects on expected inflation, but not on real inter-
est rates, which is what we see in the commodity
futures market.
CONCLUSION
Although the commodity futures data contain
a substantial amount of idiosyncratic noise, they
remain an important source of information about
how markets respond to the implementation of
monetary policy. Evidence presented in this paper
shows that real rates of return in commodity
markets do not appear to react to surprises in the
federal funds target. This result complements
research showing that real rates in the long-term
market for inflation-protected Treasury securities
also do not respond to these surprises. This is also
the result predicted by New Keynesian macro-
economic models if the shocks to the federal funds
target appear to be persistent. Persistent shocks
lead to a significant (almost one-for-one) response
by expected inflation but no measurable response
by the real interest rate. 
Our results show that despite the relative noise
in commodity futures markets, the commodity
expected inflation rate does respond significantly
to surprises in the federal funds rate. The result
is consistent with modern theory, but not with
conventional wisdom. Conventional wisdom
suggests that expected inflation does not respond
immediately, but only with a long lag—and the
response should be negative, as was found in the
long-term indexed bond market. Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2003) and Kliesen and Schmid
(2004a) find that the long-term expected inflation
rate falls when there is a surprise increase in the
federal funds rate. Our results suggest that the
short-term response is different. That is, expected
inflation, at least as observed in commodity mar-
kets, over the next 3 to 9 months moves in the
same direction as a surprise in the federal funds
rate target. 
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